This publication is part of our Annual Threat Monitor report that was released on the 8th of Febuary 2023. The Annual threat Monitor report can be found here.

Authored by Alberto Segura


Hydra, also known as BianLian, has been one of the most active mobile banking malware families in 2022, alongside Sharkbot and Flubot (until Flubot was taken down by Law Enforcement at the end of May 2022).

The features implemented in this banking malware are present in most of the banking malware families: injections/overlays, keylogging (listening to Accessibility events) and, since June 2022, Hydra has even introduced a cookie-stealing feature which targeted several banking entities in Spain.

It is interesting to see that lately different banking malware families are introducing the possibility to steal cookies. This could originate from cybercriminals being more eager to rent banking malware with this capability, hence giving the malware author more revenue when implemented.

During our research, we found that an important number of the command-and-control (C2) servers are located in the Netherlands. This is an interesting pattern, especially since threat actors (TAs) active in mobile malware have been frequently hosting their infrastructure in Russia and China.

Credential-stealing Features

Hydra is an Android banking malware whose main goal is stealing credentials, so TAs can access those accounts and monetize them directly or indirectly by selling them to third parties. Hydra steals credentials using the following two strategies:

  • Overlays/Injections, at the beginning of the infection, it sends a few requests to the C2 server, and receives a list of targeted applications and a URL that points to a ZIP file which contains the corresponding injections. The targets consist mostly of banks and cryptocurrency wallets. Hydra saves these injections locally and shows them as soon as it detects a user opening a banking application. That way, the victim thinks it is the official application that requests credentials or credit card information.
Server response with a configuration including the URL to download a ZIP file containing all the injections
Contents of the ZIP file with the injections

When the injection is shown and the victim enters his credentials, the malware uses JavaScript’s “Console.Log” function to send the credentials to the native Java code of the application. This function is reimplemented by the malware to send credentials to the C2 server, which is shown in the figure below.

Decompiled code used to save the stolen credentials
Decompiled code used to send the stolen credentials to the C2 server
  • Keylogging,Hydra abuses the Accessibility permissions to set up an Accessibility service that receives every Accessibility event happening on the infected device. This way the malware receives change events for TextFields (to steal usernames and passwords) and button clicks.
Keylogger code

In order to complement the credential-stealing features, Hydra includes a screencast component that sends screenshots to the C2 server and receives commands used to simulate Accessibility events (click buttons, enter text in TextFields, etc.). This way the TAs can manipulate the target application on the victim’s device to monetize the account associated with that application. This is a good way to bypass antifraud security measures focused on checking IP addresses or devices that log in to the accounts or make transfers.

Screencast feature starting code

Besides credential-stealing features, Hydra implements features to steal other information from the infected device. Especially information required for successful account takeovers and monetization of accounts, such as received SMS messages for OTP codes, a list of installed applications, or the unlock code of the device which can be used to unlock the device and start the screencast feature.

Apart from the previously mentioned features, Hydra developers introduced a new and interesting feature around June 2022: stealing cookies. With this new feature, the malware can steal cookies from sessions linked to bank accounts of victims, avoiding the need of credentials when logging in.

New features: Stealing Cookies

Around June 2022 we found new samples introducing this new feature used to steal cookies from sessions after the victims log in to their accounts. Since the beginning until now, there are not that many targeted banks or other applications targeted by this feature, but the list has been increasing in the past months.

It started targeting a few applications – Google Mail and BBVA Spain -, as we can see in the following image:

Targeted applications in the first versions including the cookie-stealing feature

But after some months, TAs included two more targets – Facebook and Davivienda – to steal credentials:

Targeted applications in the latest version

As we can see in the previous pictures of the decompiled code, to implement this feature, TAs include the package name of the targeted applications alongside the URLs to the mobile login website. This way, a WebView can show the victim the official login page and, after the victim successfully logs in to his account, the cookies of the loaded website in the WebView are forwarded to the C2 server.

Hydra creates a POST request to send credentials or cookies to the C2 server

It is interesting that TAs include the list of targeted applications by the cookie-stealing feature hardcoded in each sample, while the list of targets for injections is retrieved from the C2 server. Since it is a new feature, it is probably in a test phase, and after some time TAs could start retrieving the list of cookie-stealer targets from the C2 server instead of hardcoding the list in the malware.

Hydra Variants

We found that Hydra has different variants with small changes between them. The principal features are present in all of them, but they include different information about the C2 server. Hydra can be categorized in three variants based on how it includes the C2 server information:

  • Using Tor, this variant includes a Tor (.onion) URL to the endpoint ‘/api/mirrors’. As response, it will receive a Base64-encoded JSON with the list of C2 servers to use. This variant includes code to download Tor native libraries in order to connect to this ‘backup C2’ using the Tor network.
Tor ‘backup C2’ response
Tor native libraries used to connect to the Tor network
  • Using GitHub, this variant includes a GitHub repository file containing a Base64-encoded JSON object with the list of C2 servers. This is almost equivalent to the Tor variant, but it uses GitHub instead of using the Tor network – it does not include code to download and run Tor native libraries.
Code to connect to GitHub to get C2 servers
GitHub file response with the Base64-encoded list of C2 servers
  • Hardcoded C2 server, this variant includes the C2 server in the binary itself and eventually sends a request to the path ‘/api/mirrors’ in order to get a new list of C2 servers that it can use in the future if the hardcoded one goes down.
C2 server hardcoded in the sample. The path ‘/api/mirrors’ is used to get an updated list of C2 servers

C2 Server Analysis

During our Hydra research, we have been collecting an important number of C2 servers used in different samples. From all those servers, we found that some countries are preferred over others in terms of hosting.

This usually happens with Russia or China, which are the preferred countries to host C2 servers by TAs, but surprisingly, Hydra’s TAs are using other countries such as the Netherlands (73), United States (42) and Ukraine (29). In this case, we observed only 19 servers hosted in Russia and none in China.

In the following picture we can see a world map with the different countries hosting Hydra’s C2 servers. The color intensity increases with the increase in amount of servers.

Popular countries for hosting Hydra C2 servers

Besides the different Hydra variants used for each sample, we found that different C2 servers are configured with a different target list. This is normal, since this malware is rented out by its developers, so each TA has different interests in what banks or applications to target. Even though most of the servers seem to use a default list of targets – probably all the supported banks/apps -, there are certain servers with a smaller list of targets, usually focused on banks or applications used in specific countries or languages – such as LATAM and Spanish banks.

Even though some servers use a different configuration – different list of targeted apps -, most of the servers use the same list. This could mean that Hydra developers ship their malware with a default list of targets or that attackers use a default list of targets themselves.

Network Detection

The behavior displayed by Hydra can be detected using network detection. The following Suricata rules were tested successfully against Hydra network traffic:

alert http $EXTERNAL_NET any -> $HOME_NET any (msg:"FOX-SRT - Trojan - Hydra Mobile Malware Configuration Observed (injects)"; flow:established,to_client; content:"|22|injects_loaded|22|:"; http_server_body; fast_pattern; threshold:type limit,track by_dst,count 1,seconds 600; reference:url,; metadata:ids suricata; metadata:created_at 2023-02-15; classtype:trojan-activity; sid:21004395; rev:1;)

alert http $EXTERNAL_NET any -> $HOME_NET any (msg:"FOX-SRT - Trojan - Hydra Mobile Malware Configuration Observed (keylogger)"; flow:established,to_client; content:"|22|enable_keylogger|22|:"; http_server_body; fast_pattern; threshold:type limit,track by_dst,count 1,seconds 600; reference:url,; metadata:ids suricata; metadata:created_at 2023-02-15; classtype:trojan-activity; sid:21004396; rev:1;)

alert http $HOME_NET any -> $EXTERNAL_NET any (msg:"FOX-SRT - Trojan - Possible Hydra Mobile Malware POST Observed"; flow:established,to_server; content:"POST"; http_method; content:"AndroidBot -> "; http_client_body; depth:64; fast_pattern; threshold:type limit,track by_src,count 1,seconds 600; reference:url,; metadata:ids suricata; metadata:created_at 2023-02-15; classtype:trojan-activity; sid:21004397; rev:1;)

These rules are compatible with Suricata 4 and later.


Hydra has been one of the most active banking malware families for Android in 2022, alongside other notorious families such as Flubot, Sharkbot and Teabot. This banker is rented out through underground forums, and TAs that rent the malware configure the list of targeted applications based on their needs. However, most of target lists we observed in Hydra samples are equivalent, hinting at a default configuration.

Typical features to steal credentials are implemented in this family: injections/overlays, keylogging and, from around June 2022, the developers also started to include cookies-stealing features to the rented samples. All these features make Hydra one of the more interesting banking malware families to rent for TAs. This can explain why we observed a lot of samples of Hydra every day, many sharing the same C2 server.

Even if the credential-stealing features and the rest of the code is the same for all the samples we detected, we found there are differences in the way the C2 servers are included in various samples. For this reason, we distinguish three different variants based on how the C2 server is included: an Onion service, a GitHub repository with the list of C2 servers and, finally, just a URL to the C2 server it should use.

During our research we also found that TAs are frequently hosting their C2s in the same countries, such as the Netherlands, United States and Ukraine, instead of hosting them in Russia or China, as usual. Additionally, most of the servers have enabled all the supported injections, instead of enabling only those applications which are more interesting to the TA depending on, for example, the country of the bank.

We expect this family to be one of the most active mobile banking malware in the upcoming months, with its developers implementing new and interesting features.